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Executive Summary Important parts of the literature on strategies of interest orga-
nizations consider the political activities of interest organizations as serving to build and
maintain exchange relationships between organizational representatives and constituents,
policymakers and the news media. The incentive for organizational survival produces
activities that links social and political domains. This review integrates various strands of
existing thinking on interest groups under an ‘exchange’ perspective. It produces a view
on interest organizations as being strategically strongly constrained through different
demands made on the organization when engaging in relationships with supporters, pol-
icymakers and journalists. While challenging, research designs should account for the
interrelated nature of these relationships rather than treating organizations as a strategi-
cally autonomous actors.
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Why do interest organizations do what they do? A number of ‘classic’ and recent studies
evaluate these political activities as exchange relationships of interest organizations
with different parts of the organizational environment (for example, Salisbury, 1969;
Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999; Bouwen, 2004). In this
review, I seek to connect the existing ‘exchange-inspired’ thinking on the mobilization
of members, the policy-related activities and outside-oriented strategies. I structure these
studies into a triangular scheme of exchanges by the interest organization with three
types of actors: (i) their supporters, (ii) political institutional actors and (iii) the news
media and other actors related to public opinion. These exchanges are governed by what
I label the logic of support, logic of inﬂuence and the logic of reputation.1
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The contribution of this review is that it explicitly incorporates the news media in
the model, further speciﬁes the supporters and institutional exchange relationships,
and presents the logics in an interrelated manner. First, the exchange relationship of
interest organizations with the news media matters as important channel of interest
group inﬂuence on public opinion, and it matters especially in view of recent
controversy over ‘publicity as a weapon for the weak’ (for example, Thrall, 2006).
Second, it also matters indirectly as it affects the relationships of interest organization
with their constituents and public authorities. By incorporating recent literature on
outside strategies, these relationships are further speciﬁed to account for the effect of
public opinion and news media reporting. Third, exchange relationships with distinct
ﬁelds of actors (supporters, politics, media) tend to be studied independent of each
other. There are small subﬁelds on legislative lobbying, the internal (member) org-
anization of groups or ‘outside-oriented’ strategies. These distinct types of organiza-
tional behavior are strongly interdependent, which makes specialized studies on any
one of them vulnerable to underspeciﬁcation. That is, for instance, opportunities for
legislative lobbying largely depend on public opinion. Parliamentarians are probably
more likely to talk to group representatives when relevant sections of public opinion
are supportive of the cause of the group. Several of such interdependencies are
explicated in the following review and could help in the design of more speciﬁed
models of patterns of behavior of interest organizations.
Furthermore, group scholars have been relatively unsuccessful in designing
country-comparative research (but see Dür and Mateo, 2013). According to Lowery
et al (2008, p. 1234), this is largely due to a lack of theory ‘that is capable of
encompassing both multiple levels of analysis and variety in contexts in which
phenomena of interest occur’. Although the outline presented here is surely not such
a theory, it may help constructing a meso-level theory that is capable of connecting
country- or issue-level frameworks with organizational level assumptions by
explicitly labeling contextual constraints and opportunities for certain political
activities.
In the following, I ﬁrst provide a behavioral deﬁnition of interest organizations and
differentiate them from political parties and social movements. Then I describe neo-
corporatist thinking on exchange theory and discuss how exchange relationships
shape interest organizations. Third, I assess the literatures bearing on the three logics
of exchange. I conclude with some modest suggestions for improving the study of the
behavior of interest organizations.
Taking the Perspective of the Interest Organization
According to most researchers, which types of political behavior makes an
organization an ‘interest organization’? First, interests needs to be organized. This
distinguishes interest organizations from broad waves of public opinion, individual
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action or loose networks of actors, commonly included in studies of social move-
ments (for example, Snow et al, 2004, p. 7; but also note organizational deﬁnitions of
social movements, see, for example, Burstein and Linton, 2002; Diani, 2012).
Second, Beyers et al (2008, p. 1106) point out that interest organizations should be
interested in inﬂuencing public policies. This may entail changing existing policy,
keeping the status quo policy, reducing government action or seeking government
recognition of a problem. Organizations may seek inﬂuence via direct interaction
with ofﬁcials or by other means. These other means, however, should not include
directly seeking public ofﬁce through elections. This differentiates interest organiza-
tions from political parties. The conceptual focus on lobbying behavior in this so-
called functional or behavioral deﬁnition of interest organizations makes it, as
highlighted by Jordan et al (2004), impossible to distinguish between interest
organizations and politically active universities, companies or other institutions (see
also Salisbury, 1992, p. 43). Such a differentiation is needed in order to conceptually
account for the phenomena associated with the aggregation and representation of
interests or causes that are shared beyond the organization itself. However, being
organized or representative need not have the form of ‘collective action’ as tra-
ditionally conceived and organizations such as companies or schools also aggregate
interests. That is, we know that such institutions have to deal with important internal
politics that may be similar to those faced by membership organizations. Heinz et al
(1993, p. 384) note that ‘the government affairs ofﬁcers of corporations, the
executives of trade associations and the heads of citizen-government groups must
justify the cost of their operations to their respective organizational constituencies –
whether the constituency is the CEO, industry members or contributors’ (for similar
argument see Hart, 2004; Hillman et al, 2004; Wilts, 2006). This latter conceptua-
lization of internal politics of ﬁrms leads to the empirical inclusion of the same
organizations as in functional or behavioral deﬁnitions, but adds a conceptual interest
in intra-institution relationships as a special case of ‘logic of support’.
This review takes the perspective of the interest organization as a building block
for theory construction on differences in political activities between organizations.
This is not self-evident because others have taken issues (for example, Kingdon,
1984; Baumgartner et al, 2009), countries (for example, Eising, 2009) or individuals
(for example, Olson, 1965; Salisbury, 1969) as conceptual building blocks. Such
perspectives have somewhat different research aims, and their focus is useful for
explaining differences in policy outcomes, examining institutional effects or
collective action, respectively. When evaluating activities of organizations, country-
level theories only provide very general hypotheses– that is, bluntly formulated
‘French unions are more likely to call a strike’, ‘US business associations tend to
choose inside lobbying’ (for example, Balme and Chabanet, 2008, p. 36; Woll,
2008). Such propositions could easily be incorporated in an organizational-level
approach, although it is more difﬁcult to meaningfully disaggregate country-level
hypotheses to the organizational level. In other words, the meso-level organizational
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perspective could help linking macro-level theories to more concrete, testable
hypotheses by subdividing the comparative research tasks into meaningful segments
(for related argument see Lowery et al, 2008).
How Exchange Relations Shape Political Activities
In the following, I review sociological thinking on exchange relationships, and
discuss neo-corporatist thinking about exchange relations and propose several
adaptations.
As a concept in (early) sociological theories explaining the workings of power,
exchange is deﬁned as a type of behavioral interaction between actors that is
voluntary, reciprocal and mutually beneﬁcial (Emerson, 1962, 1976; Blau, 1964;
Levine and White, 1961). Exchange theoretical work is closely associated resource
dependency (Jacobs, 1974; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;
Aldrich, 1979) and resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).
Exchange relationships involve the reciprocal ﬂow of valued behavior, or, formu-
lated differently, the exchange of resources between two actors. Emerson (1976,
p. 347) speciﬁes that a ‘resource is an ability, possession, or other attribute of an actor
giving him the capacity to reward (or punish) another speciﬁed actor’. Resources are
clearly not restricted to ﬁnancial resources and are behavioral and relational: they are
‘not possessions or attributes of individual actors, but rather they are attributes of the
relationship between actors’ (Emerson, 1976, p. 348). They may be used in exchange
relationships but also in various other types of interaction such as regulation, use of
force or competition (Blau, 1964, p. 124). Consequently, ‘social exchange is limited
to actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others and that cease when
these expected reactions are not forthcoming’ (1964, p. 6). This bilateral exchange is,
even by relatively powerful actors, usually favored over any other type of interaction
because the mutually rewarding character makes it the most cost-effective way to
generate power (for example, Jordan and Richardson, 1982, p. 95). It is therefore a
useful perspective also in cases where one actor depends more strongly on the other
than vice versa, so-called asymmetry, as is commonly the case for relationships of
interest organizations with policymakers, supporters or journalists. Exchange
relationships between different domains and associated actor types are assumed to
be more valuable than relationships among interest organizations as dissimilar
resources can be put into exchange. Such exchange relationships are central in this
review and they commonly require intermediaries organizing the connections
between domains. Interest organizations are in the business of managing exchange
relationships between different domains.
In interest group literature, we ﬁnd the most explicit sociological exchange-
theoretical references in Salisbury (1969), neo-corporatist industrial relationships
literature (for example, Molina and Rhodes, 2002) and neo-corporatist organizational
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thinking. I take the latter as a starting point for this review. On the ﬁrst, Salisbury
(1969) solely focuses on the process of group formation. His main interest is in the
relationship between group leaders/entrepreneurs and (potential) members, prioritiz-
ing that relationship relative to political or public relationships. The review presented
here does not contradict his point but more explicitly speciﬁes the additional
organizational constraints arising from different types of exchange relationships.
Second, political-economic studies of interest organizations tend to use a deﬁnition
of exchange that is ﬁrmly embedded in industrial relations (for example, Molina and
Rhodes, 2002; Molina, 2006: 645–646; Baccaro and Simoni, 2008). For instance,
Molina and Rhodes (2002, p. 322) follow Marin’s (1990, p. 40) deﬁnition of
‘political exchange as forms of mutually contingent, macropolitical and none-
conomic transaction between autonomous, organized, collective actors with
divergent/competitive/antagonistic but functionally interdependent interests, the
binding character of which cannot be based on law and contract’ (also see Pizzorno,
1978). This deﬁnition of political exchange is speciﬁcally aimed at understanding
agreements between sometimes clearly antagonistic interests employers and
unions, and only partially applies to the various exchange relationships of a broader
range of interest organizations with actors that need not have interests that are
antagonistic to theirs.
We ﬁnd the most explicit and elaborate use of the above-mentioned sociological
exchange tradition in neo-corporatist studies of interest organization. The term neo-
corportatism is here used to denote a research tradition within studies of interest
representation, not studies of state formation, normative studies or otherwise. In a
neo-corporatist perspective, interest organizations are ﬁrst and foremost intermedi-
aries between government and their constituents. Interest organizations offer their
supporters collective interest representation before government. The combination
of interest articulation (government representation) and interest aggregation (act
collectively) put them in an intermediate position between the state on the one hand
and society or the economy on the other (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005, p. 451).
These two environments operate under two logics of exchange that produces
organizational tensions (Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, pp. 19–30). The explication
of such organizational tensions and associated ‘logics’ (also see Offe and Wiesenthal,
1980) is the main contribution to above-mentioned sociological exchange theories
and is further elaborated in the next section.
In this perspective, organizational leaders who successfully mobilize a large
proportion of potential members are rewarded with policy access, while ‘narrow’
and partially mobilized interests will receive only limited access. This produces
non-competitive (corporatist) environments, where there are only very few policy-
networked interest organization per sector, and where members, presumably inter-
ested in policy access, do not ﬁnd other or new interest organizations to choose from
(Schmitter, 1974, 1979). The interests of members are consequently compromised
through their association in relatively broad organizations. Leaders may be further
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inclined to compromise members’ preferences and interests through their close
involvement in the policy process and presumed concomitant distance from their
‘base’. The incentives governing these two exchange relationships produce a trade-
off between a more diverse constituency or broader membership base and more
compromised policy demands but a stronger negotiation position vis-à-vis policy-
makers (Streeck and Kenworthy, 2005, p. 451).
This traditional neo-corporatist tension with its focus on exchange logics has in
one way or another become part of most studies on political strategies of interest
organizations. At the same time, research interest in the effect of public opinion and
the news media has also been growing (for example, Kollman, 1998; Thrall, 2006;
Kriesi et al, 2007; Binderkrantz, 2012), associated with debates about the ‘mediatisa-
tion’ of contemporary politics (for example, Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; Kriesi,
2004). In order to reﬂect this, I include a third exchange relationship – that between
the news media and the interest organization – which I label ‘logic of reputation’.
This relationship is shaped through outside-oriented and public strategies, such as the
transformation of policy information to newsworthy events, voicing constituents’
concerns in public debate and organizing members’ participation in public action.
The logic of reputation is distinct from the logic of inﬂuence and support, as it is
governed by different ‘media institutional’ principles (Schudson, 2002), such as the
news values held by journalists. It also affects the opportunities and constraints for
other relationships, therefore I also explicitly refer to studies that assess the impact of
the news media on the relationship with supporters and political institutions,
producing a more elaborate speciﬁcation of the logics of inﬂuence and support than
in neo-corporatist views outlined above.
This has a number of implications on our thinking on tensions with which interest
organizations have to deal. First, by including public opinion and news media
considerations of leaders, the strategic tensions become stronger and choices
available to the organization narrower. For example, ‘going public’may be beneﬁcial
in terms of the reputation of the interest group among a broader public, but at the
same time have mixed effects on supporters and negative effects in terms of the logic
of inﬂuence. As Lipsky (1968, p. 1054) argues, ‘people in power do not like to sit
down with rogues’ and ‘few [advocates] can be convincing as advocate and arbiter at
the same time’. Second, it broadens the applicability of the neo-corporatist exchange
scheme toward social movement organizations. The scheme is, as intended, biased
toward activities typical to business associations such as inside lobbying. Other
groups, such as social movement organizations, are traditionally expected to have a
tactical preference for outside or public strategies. Third, one of the key differences
between political systems is related to the relative importance of outside opportu-
nities and strategies. Balme and Chabanet (2008, p. 34) point to ‘protest systems’,
such as France, where acquiring increased publicity is strategically dominant,
where ‘unfavorable policy and institutional opportunities [for pluralist lobbying or
corporatist consultation] may be partially compensated for by the opening of
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windows of opportunity for the mobilization of interests using media activity’ (for
similar arguments on political opportunities see Kriesi et al, 1995). The assessment
of such country differences also requires the explicit incorporation of media
relationships in organization-level theories.
Constraints in Gaining Support, Inﬂuence and Reputation
To repeat, interest organizations organize exchange relationships between members
and political institutions, political institutions and the news media, and the news
media and members. Through these reciprocal ﬂows of valued behavior, they con-
nect political institutions, supporters and the news media. For the sake of the clarity
of this review, I only focus on those exchange relationships that not only connect
interest organizations with other actors but also help interest organizations to forge
exchange relationship in other domains. It is only in these cases that interest organi-
zations potentially function as intermediaries. Each exchange relationship is under-
stood in association with relationships under other logics. The range of activities
described below is narrowed down by its exclusive focus on exchange relationships
(as opposed to among others formal regulatory relations), on inter-domain relation-
ships (as opposed to contacts among interest organizations) and on relationships that
potentially facilitate relationships with other domains (as opposed to, for instance,
‘purely’ membership maintenance activities).
Each logic of exchange consists of four types of resources, and several environ-
mental factors affecting the value of these resources. Each of the connected arrows
in Figure 1 is discussed below and the discussion in this section is summarized in
Table 1 and the numbers in the text refer to this table.
Figure 1: Exchange relationships of interest organizations.
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The logic of support
The logic of support assumes that activities are driven by the need for organizational
survival. As Lowery (2007, p. 46) notes, ‘the most fundamental goals of organiza-
tions must be to survive as organizations’. Organizational survival and maintenance
primarily depends on the recruitment of members and the mobilization of an existing
supporters’ base. Salisbury (1969, p. 2) classically argued that ‘interest group origins,
growth, death and associated lobbying activity may all be better explained if we
regard them as exchange relationships between entrepreneurs/organizers, who invest
capital in a set of beneﬁts, which they offer to prospective members at a price –
membership’. Besides membership dues, these exchange relationships concern
activities related to (i) constituents’ policy compliance, (ii) members’ public action,
(iii) members’ control over leaders and (iv) the public visibility of a political issue.
The nature of these activities is shaped by the type of supporters (citizens,
companies), their interests (diffuse, concentrated) and the interest community of
which the organization is part (level of competition).
First, members or supporters provide organizations with (future) compliance with
policies, (potential) political support for governing parties and newsworthy participa-
tion in public political events. For instance, business interest associations could
facilitate strategic adaptations of their members’ organizations to new policies
(Schmitter and Streeck, 1985). Members can offer such cooperation or not. Further,
as highlighted in studies of social movements, supporters socialize among each other
and participate in the (public) activities of interest organizations such as conferences,
campaign events and demonstrations. Such membership socialization (Beyers, 2008,
pp. 1202–1204) and participation forms the basis of exchange relationships in the
institutional (loyalty fosters compliance) and the news media environment (participa-
tion could create newsworthy ‘events’). As Lipsky (1968, p. 1149) notes, and is further
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emphasized below, ‘leaders’ ability to control protest constituents and guarantee their
behavior represents a bargaining strength’ in negotiations with policymakers.
Second, in return for their compliance or public support, leaders supply members
with control mechanisms and with favorable news media contributions. This control
varies between active, representative ‘voice’ mechanisms, such as leadership
elections, to more passive, administrative ‘exit’ mechanisms under which leaders
follow (through polls and so on) the preferences of their constituents so as to prevent
them from leaving (Hirschman, 1970, p. 21). This distinction between administrative
and representative means is commonly seen as mutually exclusive (Child et al, 1973;
Kriesi, 1996, p. 153; Schmitter and Streeck, 1999, pp. 19–20) and is closely related to
the much-discussed professionalization of membership groups (for example, Verba
et al, 1995; Skocpol, 2003; Binderkrantz, 2009; Walker et al, 2011; Maloney, 2012).
Administrative means are associated with the efﬁcient operation of the organization,
such as relying on professional management as opposed to volunteers, using task
specialization and relying on donations instead of membership dues. Representative
means, in contrast, refer to ‘widespread membership involvement’ via participation
and volunteering, and sometimes even independently voicing policy positions
(for example, Gamson, 2004, p. 253). This may create committed or ‘disciplined’
membership base that may be offered as future policy compliance (or not). Both the
provision of opportunities for participation and the ‘threat’ of members leaving is a
liability for organizational leaders as members gain some control over the organization
(for example, Jordan and Maloney, 2007, pp. 145–170), and sometimes provide
‘biased’ signals on their own policy preferences (Lohmann, 1993). Further, organiza-
tional entrepreneurs seek to provide members with attention to the organization in the
news media and other public venues (Gais and Walker, 1991, p. 103; Jordan and
Maloney, 1997). The public visibility of the organization and its cause is, for instance,
often emphasized via internal organizational media (Website, newsletters, magazines).
Members want that their concerns and interests receive recognition in the public
debate; in Salisbury’s (1969, p. 16) terms these are ‘expressive beneﬁts’.
On the basis of this, we may hypothesize that we should expect leaders to seek to
socialize or discipline their supporters while restricting membership control over
leaders.
The extent to which both partially contradictory goals can be achieved depends on
contextual factors related to social and organizational context: the types of members,
supporters and interests represented, and the density of the interest community. First,
the magnitude of collective action problems varies between diffuse interests on the
one hand and specialized or concentrated interests on the other hand (Olson, 1965).
Through their attention to certain interest organizations, the news media help
diffusely interested constituents alleviate collective action problems. It seems that
citizens are organized on diffuse interests, and companies (or other organizations)
seek collective action on specialized interests. Exchange relations in the news media
environment are consequently more important for citizen groups with diffuse
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interests than for other interest organizations. As pointed out by Gais and Walker
(1991, p. 106), they rely on ‘an outside strategy of public persuasion and political
mobilization’ (also see Binderkrantz, 2008). Offe and Wiesenthal (1980, p. 79)
present this argument in a more abstract manner when they argue that ‘the relatively
powerless’, such as most citizen groups, require public discourse to ‘simultaneously
deﬁne and express interests’, whereas the ‘powerful’ only need the media to
(strategically) express their interests. In other words, diffuse interests rely on public
action to help ‘overcoming the comparatively higher costs of collective action by
changing the standards according to which these costs are subjectively estimated
within their own collectivity’ (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980, p. 78). Furthermore, the
nature of the interest of the constituents (diffuse, specialized) probably correlates
with the distribution of their interests across policy sectors. As Beyers (2008,
p. 1201) notes, ‘the larger the scope of an organization, the more policy sectors and
issues it needs to cover, the larger and more heterogeneous its constituency’. As we
know that political activities vary by policy sector, organizations that are active in a
variety of sectors are also likely to require a broad range of inﬂuence tactics and
membership-related activities. Organizations that represent diffuse interests thus,
necessarily, engage in a broader range of both institutional and public activities than
organizations that represent narrower interests.
This leads to the hypothesis that we should expect leaders of organizations
representing diffuse interests to have more limited control over their supporters than
leaders of organizations representing speciﬁc interests.
Second, interest organization population density reduces the value of the
supporters-related resources in exchanges with policymakers. In neo-corporatist
thinking, competitive pressures from similar organizations (density) have a straight-
forward detrimental effect on the capacity of interest organizations to strike policy
deals. As Streeck and Kenworthy (2005, p. 451) note, ‘the logic of inﬂuence tends to
place a premium on interest organizations being broadly based and representing more
general instead of highly special interests’. Policymakers are not interested in a
variety of exchanges with specialized actors in a fragmented interest community, but
seek to exchange a representational monopoly with a single interest organization that
aggregates various interests within a sector. This is impossible in dense communities.
Similarly, but more nuanced, population ecology studies show that organizations in
dense interest communities and with similar political positions are likely to specialize
by tactic (Gray and Lowery, 1998). In terms of exchange relationships, this suggests
that to avoid conﬂict with fellow organizations and to cope with the relatively low
value of their supporters-related resources they divide the interest community along
lines of institutional interaction, news media contacts and supporters base (with the
latter taking priority Gray and Lowery, 1996). Density in the interest organization
population is consequently likely to strongly reduce the range of strategic options, as
is further reﬂected in the construction of interest group identities in speciﬁc niches
(Heaney, 2004). Third, studies of social movement industries similarly ﬁnd that
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tactical and positional specialization is related to interest community density
(McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Downey and Rohlinger, 2008). This effect operates
together with, in the words of Soule and King (2008, p. 1598), the ‘inﬂuence of a
broader environmental resource base’ within society that favors unspecialized, more
general organizations. Competitive pressures, they suggest, lead to a community that
is typical of concentrated markets: a couple of (older) generalists on the one hand,
and various specialists emerging and ﬂowering in the fringes of the sector on the
other (for similar ﬁndings see Browne, 1990).
In terms of the logic of support, the following hypothesis may be formulated: we
should expect leaders of organizations in dense environments to have more limited
control over their supporters than leaders of organizations operating in monopoly
environments.
The logic of inﬂuence
The interaction of interest organizations with political institutions has fre-
quently been conceptualized as an exchange relationship. This is the case in pluralist
(Bauer et al, 1963, pp. 154–178), economic (for example, McChesney, 1997),
resource-dependency (Bouwen, 2004, p. 338; Beyers and Kerremans, 2007;
Poppelaars, 2009), policy-oriented (for example, Jordan and Richardson, 1982) and
corporatist approaches to interest representation. However, in each of these
traditions, the exchange relationship is largely considered independent of interactions
of interest organizations with their supporters or in the media. In order to inﬂuence
public policy, interest organizations engage in activities related to: (v) supporters’
policy discipline and political/technical information, (vi) policy frames in the news
media that are ‘acceptable’ to policymakers, (vii) the maintenance of organizational
privileges and favorable policies and (viii) monitoring institutional activity. Whether
and how these activities produce successful exchange relationships depend on the
type of political control potentially exerted upon the actor or venue lobbied
(parliament, minister, bureaucratic venue) and on the system of structured interest
group access in general.
First, organizational leaders offer policymakers the compliance (or not) of their
constituents. As discussed earlier, leaders have varying modes and levels of control
over their supporters. Leaders may have some formal powers but also have means
such as informal persuasion via internal media, appeals to supporters’ loyalty and
socialization via membership participation. In situations of limited constituent
control, they can still offer political actors information on political support. This is
what according to Hall and Deardorff (2006) must be understood as a legislative
subsidy by interest organizations to members of parliament. Such information on
political support or possible non-compliance or resistance could help to increase the
effectiveness of policies (Poppelaars, 2009, pp. 4–6).
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Furthermore, in relation to public debate, interest organizations can attempt to
transform public claims into policy-relevant material such as policy statements and
reports. These are valuable for policymakers in order to respond to public
challengers. Whereas organizations provide input for the news media (see below),
the point here is about the ways in which news media attention is translated into
policies (or not) or may provide ammunition for bureaucrats in competition with
other parts of the state apparatus, as emphasized by Jordan and Richardson (1982,
p. 85). Interest organizations contribute to the transformation of the ‘popular rhetoric’
of the news media into the policy speak of political institutions, or, in contrast,
strategically use news media frames to challenge existing policy frames in the policy
sector. Thus, interest organizations offer to or withhold from politicians the
instruments or, again in Hall and Deardorff’s (2006) words ‘legislative subsidies’,
they need to respond to news media signals.
Second, state ofﬁcials can give interest organizations access to the policy process.
This could range from a formal constitutional role, including legally binding decision
powers or representational monopolies, to informal irregular contact with a
parliamentarian. Access is beneﬁcial for the interest organizations because it has
indirect effects on the membership environment and may lead to favorable policies.
Formal access could indirectly have structuring effects on the membership environ-
ment by making certain organizations more attractive to potential members than
other organizations. Access is also the ﬁrst step for policymakers toward making
substantive policy concessions favorable to the constituents of the interest organiza-
tion (Bouwen and McCown, 2007).
In order to maintain or construct a positive reputation of the interest represented,
interest organizations monitor policies and assess upcoming legislation to transform
this information for the news media (and through internal media, to inform their
constituents). They rely on policymakers to supply them with policy-relevant or
politically strategic information. Among others, they need this expertise for the
provision of ‘information subsidies’ in the news media environment (Gandy, 1982;
Hamilton, 2004). For instance, as Keck and Sikkink (1999, pp. 97–98) point out,
strategies such as ‘accountability politics’ require thorough policy research, attending
to both policy circles and the broader news media.
Under the logic of inﬂuence, the following hypothesis should hold: Interest
organizations are provided with policy information and policy access when they
offer various forms of legislative subsidies to policymakers.
The institutional position of speciﬁc policy venues and the broader (national)
institutional context affects the logic of inﬂuence. First, two aspects of the speciﬁc
position of the institutional counterpart matter: the level of democratic control of
political actors and the opportunities for venue shopping. Political actors who are
under relatively direct electoral control, such as parliamentarians, are likely to favor
news media resources. In contrast, venues or actors that are at arm’s length of public
scrutiny are likely to be interested in the exchange of constituency-related resources,
Berkhout
238 © 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2047-7414 Interest Groups & Advocacy Vol. 2, 2, 227–250
such as information about future compliance. For instance, Bouwen (2004) found
that the European Parliament was more interested in information on broader political
support and the European Commission more interested in speciﬁc (technical)
information about the sector and members of interest organizations. Further, the
authority to make decisions could be concentrated in a speciﬁc institution, a policy
venue or, as seems to be increasingly the case, be spread across a system of actors as
tends to be the case in federal or multi-level governance systems (for example,
Hooghe and Marks, 2003). In the latter situation, interest organizations could ‘shop’
for receptive venues in order to ﬁnd the best offer for their resources (Jones and
Baumgartner, 1991, p. 1050; Mazey and Richardson, 2001).
Formulated as hypothesis, we should ﬁnd that interest organizations have to offer
different types of legislative subsidies to different institutional venues, and that they
have to offer fewer subsidies (per venue) in case multiple venues are available.
The broader (national) political context, secondly, structures the inﬂuence
environment. This context guarantees (or not) the reciprocity of exchange relations.
It is assumed that in corporatist inﬂuence environments the credibility of the com-
mitments of the exchange partners is strengthened via such things as social norms,
political culture and aspects of the party system. In corporatist systems, it is more
likely that interest organizations build lasting and important exchange relations with
government actors than in countries with a pluralist tradition. In terms of the logic
of inﬂuence, we may thus hypothesize that interest organizations in corporatist
countries have to offer fewer ‘subsidies’ than interest organizations in other systems.
The logic of reputation
A third rationale for the existence of interest organizations is their plausible
presentation of arguments, their support in public opinion and their recognition by
the news media. The news media or public environment consists of journalists and
other relevant news intermediaries (blogs, conferences, public debates). The interac-
tion between journalists and interest organizations has always been of particular
interest in social movement research (for example, Gamson, 2004; Andrews and
Caren, 2010), and within this ﬁeld it has occasionally been explicitly theorized as an
exchange relationship (for example, Wolfsfeld, 1984, 1991; Terkildsen et al, 1998;
Koopmans, 2004; Binderkrantz and Christiansen, 2012).
Recent studies do not ﬁnd supporting evidence for two commonly held assump-
tions about this relationship: the ﬁrst being that challengers of public policy outside
or excluded from established institutional arenas are expected to necessarily equip
themselves with symbolic, media- and public-oriented action repertoires, and the
second being that the news media is an ally to resonate their voices (Lasswell, 1950,
pp. 235–236; Dahl, 1956, p. 145; Schattschneider, 1960, p. 40; Lipsky, 1968,
p. 1144; Wilson, 1974, pp. 284–289; 1961, p. 291). As regards the strategies of interest
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organizations, recent empirical evidence suggests that interest organizations with
strong institutional presence ‘persist’ their inﬂuence and also secure media
presence (Beyers, 2004; Kriesi et al, 2007, pp. 53–55). Interest organizations, for
various reasons, do not or cannot ‘compensate’ their institutional absence with
strong media presence. As regards the receptiveness of the news media to interest
organizations, recent research is concerned with the relative presence of interest
organizations in the media compared with other actors or with the difference among
interest organizations in media attention (Danielian and Page, 1994; Thrall, 2006;
Binderkrantz, 2012; van Dalen, 2012). Both ‘biases’ are sometimes labeled ‘media
bias’ and tend to be supported by empirical evidence. This is again in contradiction
to the earlier expectation that in the ‘open’ media arena we should ﬁnd lower levels
of bias than in the ‘closed’ institutional arena.
In the following section, it is discussed that interest organizations offer: (ix)
newsworthy ‘events and drama’, and (x) policy-relevant newsworthy information, in
exchange for (xi) latent public opinion support, and (xii) validation of their organi-
zation and issue expansion or containment of issues of interest to the organization.
Actual exchanges are conditioned by the media system of a country and by the actual
public opinion on speciﬁc policy issues.
First, interest organizations could provide journalists with information or events
that ﬁt with criteria of newsworthiness (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). Organizations
ranging from social movement organizations to business interest associations
produce various types of attention-grabbing media events. When it comes to social
movement organizations, Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, pp. 116–117) point out that
despite media selection bias (for example, McCarthy et al, 1996; Oliver and Maney,
2000; Earl et al, 2004) ‘social movements often make good copy for the media. They
provide drama, conﬂict and action; colorful copy; and photo opportunities’. Business
interests also seek favorable coverage; recent studies highlight the direct public
engagement on the part of corporate public affairs departments. They provide the
media directly with stories and make statements related to public policy, especially
when challenged (Wilts and Skippari, 2007, p. 132; de Bakker and den Hond, 2008;
Dahan, 2009). Further, through their involvement in the policy process, interest
organizations have expertise on public policy and on the ways their constituents are
affected by policies. Such knowledge about and statements on the political game
could be valuable news input. This is especially so when it is produced in a format
that news media can easily process. These are so-called ‘information subsidies’ such
as press statements, pre-fabricated items or contact details of members willing to
provide stories to journalists. Gandy (1982, p. 14) criticizes such Public Affairs
activities and suggests that they undermine the autonomy of the news media: ‘often
the value of an information subsidy for any source is increased to the extent that the
source can disguise the promotional, partisan and self-interested quality of the
information’ (see also Negrine, 1996, pp. 11, 27). However, despite ‘colorful copy’
and information subsidies, various recent studies point to the disadvantaged position
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of interest organizations relative to other policy actors in getting media attention
(Thrall, 2006; Binderkrantz, 2012; van Dalen, 2012). Such studies ﬁnd support for
Bennett’s (1990) ‘idea that news is “indexed” implicitly to the range and dynamics of
government debate’; in other words, interest organizations rank ‘low’ on the index of
sources of journalists, with ofﬁcial, government sources being ‘high’ on their index
(for similar argument see Cook, 1998). ‘Ofﬁcial sources’ are prioritized relative to
other sources of political information (Bennett et al, 2007, p. 36), setting in motion
media mechanisms ‘cumulative inequality’, again to the disadvantage of most
interest organizations (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993, p. 117). Interest organizations
consequently will have to invest substantial resources in order to get journalists to
report on their cause and position. It seems that only those interest organizations that
are successful under the logic of support (that is, mobilize a large number of people)
or under the logic of inﬂuence (that is, have extensive access to government ofﬁcials)
are able to ‘persist’ their success when engaging in exchange relationships with
journalists (Beyers, 2004; Kriesi et al, 2007; Dür and Mateo, 2013).
Second, news media coverage provides latent public support for the goals of the
organization. News media activate and mobilize audiences and increase public
support for the causes of interest organizations and social movements. This strength-
ens membership recruitment. As Rucht (2004, p. 211) writes: ‘Positive [public]
reactions range from increased sympathy to occasional acts of support to continuous
and full commitment [in the form of membership of the organization]’. In their
survey of campaign organizations, Jordan and Maloney (2007, p. 96) found that
96 per cent of the organizations report that new members are attracted because
individuals directly contact the groups at their own initiative. Public reputation largely
determines whether individuals consider contacting an organization. For the recruit-
ment of new members, organizations depend in large part on the ‘free publicity’ of
news media coverage. As Gamson and Wolfsfeld (1993, p. 116) note, ‘movements
must reach their constituents through some form of public discourse’. Similarly, but
formulated as a ‘second level’ of mobilization, Offe and Wiesenthal (1980, p. 96)
emphasize that for a broad range of causes the ﬁrst task of interest organizations is to
convince citizens through public discourse to ‘see better what it really is’ that they
want, before potential members support certain interest organizations.
Furthermore, interest organizations seek organizational validation and standing to
be taken seriously by supporters and policymakers. In the words of Gamson and
Wolfsfeld (1993, p. 116), ‘the media spotlight validates the fact that the movement is
an important player’. Validation matters for both new and more established interest
organizations; considering their ‘informal’ character, interest organizations require
validation per political issue and need to continuously reafﬁrm their validity as
relevant actors. For new organizations that have no policy access at all, it does not
matter how their activities make it to the news media; in all cases they accrue the
policy or supporters beneﬁts of organizational validation – as Gamson (2004, p. 252)
writes: ‘No news is bad news’, or as Lipsky (1968, p. 1151) writes on protest
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organizations: ‘like a tree falling unheard in a forest, there is no protest unless protest
is perceived and projected’ (also see Koopmans, 2004, p. 373).
Journalists could set the political agenda or expand the policy conﬂict. Depending
on circumstances, this may either spoil the policy game for interest organizations or
provide badly needed government recognition. On the one hand, as Lowery (2007,
p. 37) summarises the literature: ‘the inﬂuence of organized interests seems to be
negatively associated with the scope of lobbying battles as measured by the number of
organizations involved, the intensity of their lobbying, and how attentive the public is’.
In general, interest organizations are likely to lose policy inﬂuence when news media
attend to ‘their interests’. Thus, organized interests would act against their own policy
interests (but not necessarily against their supporters preferences) when they seek
media attention. On the other hand, media attention is needed in cases where interest
organizations would like to change the range of actors involved or seek government
recognition of a social problem as an policy issue. The ﬁrst is the case for ‘losers’ of
status quo policies, as Schattschneider (1960, p. 40) points out that it is the ‘weak who
want to socialize conﬂict, that is, involve more and more people in the conﬂict until the
balance of forces is changed’. The latter is the case for ‘new’ issues where the media
spotlight serves to recognize a situation as a public problem and potential political issue
requiring government attention (for example, Walgrave and van Aelst, 2006).
Under the logic of reputation, it is hypothesized that (all kinds of) interest
organizations should extensively attempt to control (but not necessarily seek)
attention in the press but that journalists require ‘newsworthiness’ that can only be
provided by a selected few interest organizations.
The character of exchange relations between interest organizations and news
media depends on the public opinion regarding an issue and the media system in a
country. First, as regards public opinion, in line with the conditional nature of outside
strategies mentioned above, Kollman (1998, pp. 155–164) argues that the selective
application and timing of outside-oriented strategies by organized interests depends
on the combination of the popularity and the salience of the policy positions of the
interest organization – that is, in situations in which groups perceive broad public
support (popularity) on policies their members care about (salience), organizations
will seek media contacts (Kollman, 1998, pp. 82–88). Kollman (1998, pp. 155–164)
labels this ‘comforting politics’ and introduces a typology to understand three other
states of public opinion that structures the likely strategies. This is shown in Figure 2.
In each situation, leaders of organizations attach varying relative values to
exchanges in the news media environment and in the inﬂuence environment. In a
situation of ‘elitist politics’, ﬁrst, when policies are not supported by a broad public and
considered unimportant by the supportive part of the public, groups will not seek
exchanges in the news media environment. In that case, the involvement of additional
political actors through public attention will change the existing balance of power in a
way that is unfavorable to the organization. In the inﬂuence environment, however,
organizations will try to suggest the policymakers that the issue is salient, when in reality
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it is not (astroturf ). Second, when policies favorable to certain groups are not supported
by a broad public and when supportive publics (constituents) consider the policy
important, groups will not signal their position to the news media. The organization
nurtures its exchanges in the supporters environment, but ‘will take care to avoid
expanding the conﬂict too much to spark the opposition’ (Kollman, 1998, p. 160). This is
‘classical interest group politics’. Third, broad public support but low salience leads to
‘latent support politics’. Interest organizations will want to exploit the favorable public
opinion by increasing the salience of the issue. They need the news media to convince
the potential intensely supportive public that the issue is worth acting upon.
Second, media systems vary in the extent to which the media system parallels the
conﬂict lines of the (party) political system. This is what Hallin and Mancini (2004)
label ‘political parallelism’. In systems with a high level of parallelism, we ﬁnd that
newspapers and the news media in general are organized along political lines. This
could, for instance, be via direct ownership of newspapers by political parties or via
party political ties to the public broadcasting system. From the perspective of interest
organizations, this matters because in systems with a high political parallelism it is
less likely that the news media provide an alternative, indirect venue to political
institutions. The structures of opportunities and access are very similar. In cases of low
political parallelism, the media system could provide a fruitful, additional arena in
which to address conﬂict dimensions that have not (yet) been institutionalized in the
political system. In other words, the so-called ‘compensation hypothesis’ is more likely
to be valid in systems with low levels of political parallelism, whereas the ‘persistence
hypothesis’ should ﬁnd stronger support in other systems. The country differences
are in line with the distinction of ‘protest regimes’ and other systems of interest
representation mentioned earlier. These country differences in media opportunities for
interest organizations have received limited scholarly attention (perhaps with the
exception of some research on social movement organizations, Kriesi et al, 1995).
Conclusion
The key conceptual beneﬁt of the presented review is that it brings together aspects of
both interest organizations (as actors) and their environment (as structures). It
highlights the constraints or tensions that arise from the interaction of interest
Comforting politicsClassical interest 
group politics
High




Figure 2: Typology of interest organization strategies by public opinion (Kollman, 1998, pp. 155–164).
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organizations with other types of actors. I hope to have clariﬁed that despite the
seemingly broad range of activities and strategic opportunities of interest organiza-
tions they are nevertheless constrained in interacting with journalists, supporters and
politicians. These constraints partially arise from contradictory demands from each of
these actors and from factors related to, among others, organizational populations,
the media system and institutional venues.
Scholars of interest organizations seem to have greater difﬁculty incorporating
such constraints in their theories than researchers on strategies of political parties.
Scholars of political parties regularly point to contradictory demands placed on the
party organization in seeking votes, public ofﬁce or policies (for example, Strom,
1990). So, why is this not more explicitly incorporated in research designs on interest
organizations? This may be because of focus on only the public policy-related
activities of organizations, consequently turning a blind eye on supporters and public
opinion. Such constraints may also remain unobserved because research designs tend
to allow very little (or no) variation between countries, issues or group types. How to
organize the research ﬁeld and individual research designs in such a way that they
remain speciﬁc enough to be falsiﬁed and simultaneously reﬂect the complex and
sometimes contradictory factors related to activities of interest organizations? I have
three modest suggestions on how to deal with this dilemma.
First, as should be clear by now, the explanation of the range of activities
associated with exchange relationships requires the inclusion of a lot of potential
explanatory factors. Therefore, researchers should not aim to explain even more than
that in a single research design. That is, related questions regarding the interest
community (Why is the interest organization population as it is?) and the questions
related to the exercise of inﬂuence (Why do some organizations seem successful and
other not?) should be considered separately. Although separate, these aspects of
interest representation or stages of the inﬂuence production process can still be
related at a general level (Lowery and Brasher, 2003, pp. 16–20; Lowery and Gray,
2004). As described, the interest populations’ phase provides potential explanations for
differences in activities, and the nature of the activities, in turn, may help to explain
variation in success of interest organizations. Following this logic, Mahoney (2008)
fruitfully divides research tasks into even smaller parts of the process of inﬂuence
production: for instance, she also distinguishes an argumentation and a framing stage.
Second, the relational nature of political activities should be included in research
designs. It takes two to tango. In our studies, we should simultaneously include
interest organizations and exchange partners such as members, journalists and
policymakers. For instance, in the examination of media-oriented activities,
we should not only interview interest organizations but also journalists. Only focusing
on the public affairs activities of interest organizations will probably leave the factors
(public opinion, newsworthiness) underlying media attention resulting from initiatives
of journalists unspeciﬁed. Such a one-sided approach will produce only partial
explanations of media attention to issues of interest organizations. Thus, although a
Berkhout
244 © 2013 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 2047-7414 Interest Groups & Advocacy Vol. 2, 2, 227–250
natural way to narrow down the research task, one cannot limit oneself to only a single
side of an exchange relationship. This also means that researchers should not fully
specialize in any of the logics of exchange. For instance, consider the evaluation of
lobbying practices in parliaments. Here we would specialize on the relationship
between parliamentarians and representatives of interest organizations. On the basis
of the usual needs of parliamentarians, we can probably produce a broad speciﬁcation
of the types of exchanges (political support, policy information) that are likely to occur.
However, we would then study these in relative isolation from factors related to,
among other things, membership or public opinion. At the minimum, when choosing
such a research focus, one needs a broad idea about the relationship with news media/
public opinion (for example, Does the interest organization lobby on a ‘popular’
issue?) and about the nature of the membership environment (Who are members? Does
the organization have competitors?). That is, as highlighted, lobbying interactions with
parliament on ‘popular’ issues will emphasize broad public support (latent or
comforting politics). Legislative lobbying by interest organizations from a competitive
environment is likely to focus on policy expertise, as their political support cannot be
credibly offered due to the fragmented nature of the support base. A more complete
speciﬁcation of lobby interactions thus requires including a broader range of factors
than only those related to the venue lobbied. This is also the case for the activities
related to the media and supporters. By specializing in a single type of exchange
relationship, we will never fully explain why interest organizations do what they do.
Several general hypotheses regarding activities of interest organizations have been
presented. Elsewhere, I have evaluated them more empirically (Berkhout, 2010;
Braun et al, 2011). The review presented provides a starting point for the examination
of various explanatory factors for the activities of interest organizations – that are, in turn,
crucial to understand the political inﬂuence of such activities.
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Note
1 Please note that various scholars have introduced ‘logics’ to denote the interaction of interest organi-
zations with their environment. Offe and Wiesenthal (1980), extending Olson (1965), differentiate two
‘logics of collective action’, Schmitter and Streeck (1999) present a logic of inﬂuence and membership and
Jordan and Richardson (1982) deﬁne a logic of negotiation. I use Streeck and Schmitter’s termi-
nology because they take the perspective of the interest organization. This is in contrast to Jordan and
Richardson (1982) who (largely) take the perspective of the policymaker. The logic of membership is
relabeled as logic of support to reﬂect the inclusion of non-membership forms of interest organization such
as companies and donation-based organizations.
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